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Continuity of Political Culture:  
The Case of Military Culture  
in East and West Germany  
in the Post-World War Two  
Military Reconstruction  
1955 to 1968

A Thesis

Presented in Partial fulfillment of the Requirements for  
degrees of Master of Political Science and Master of Slavic  
and Eastern European Studies in the Graduate School of the  
Ohio State University

by

Harald C. Buchholz

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The Ohio State University

1992

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CHAPTER I  
THE PROPOSITION AND ITS CONTEXT

Introduction

How persistent is political culture? Given violent and deep discontinuity in a political culture, does the historical political culture reassert itself? Does the political culture of elites develop new long-term constellations of beliefs, or are new constellations temporary and inevitably replaced by historical patterns.

The debate over the durability of political culture among political science's comparativists is typified by the argument between Harry Eckstein and Herbert Werlin. The former asserts that political culture is not malleable in the long-term, and any attempts at rapid change only result in short-term reorientation. There is no long-term reorientation, instead a "formlessness" or legalism, defined as ritualistic conformity, is the outcome.<sup>1</sup> In the long-term there is continuity as the historical political culture reasserts itself. Werlin insists that the experience of the

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<sup>1</sup>Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, (September 1988): passim.

World Bank demonstrates that the prerequisite for successful change is adequate planning. He describes such planning as developing the appropriate "software" for application to the political environment.<sup>2</sup> Thus he denies the continuity of political culture.

This study looks at the question of political culture's continuity using post-World War Two German political elites' beliefs about civil-military relations. In both East and West Germany problems surrounding the recreation of military forces brought critical aspects of the political culture into question. The development of these political elites' beliefs toward military policy is an interesting test of the persistence of political culture. The German military was not just defeated, but also disgraced by atrocities it had committed, and condemned due to its complicity in the plans of the National Socialists. This was the second defeat in which the military had played a role in a short 35 year period . Further, the level of destruction in urban and rural areas was of an unprecedented level. The result was a society that was largely pacifist and negative about the possibility of any positive civil-military relationship.

Thus the conditions for a radical reorientation of the political culture's beliefs about the military seem to have existed in the Germanies after World War Two. How the two

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<sup>2</sup>Herbert Werlin, "Political Culture and Political Change," in American Political Science Review, 84, (March, 1990): passim.



Germanies' political elites perceive civil-military relations and what aspects of political culture are used to justify their perceptions provide insight into the continuity of political culture. Did the political elites develop a new constellation of beliefs about the relationship between the military and the state, and between the military and society, or was there a reincarnation of previous beliefs? If they did adopt a new constellation of beliefs when they recreated their militaries, did it persist or revert to historical patterns in the long-term?

The hypothesis that guides this study is that political culture is immutable. If a political culture is disrupted, then elements of the previous political culture will reassert themselves. In the case of the two Germanies, if political culture is durable, then their political cultures should become more similar over time. This is due to their identical historical backgrounds. The upshot is that I argue in favor of the persistence of political culture.

The bench-mark for measuring change is the constellation of beliefs represented by the *Wehrmacht* ideal-type. This ideal-type is elaborated upon below. This is the military culture that was discredited in 1945. While it is hard to gauge the real degree of acceptance of this military culture in the German military and society during the World War, it is clear that it exerted a huge force in German society. The type of societal organization that it represents

is credited with extraordinary military successes, as well as economic recovery and growth. The Nazis successfully mobilized the entire German society through the tenets of its ideology. Its success is can thus be regarded as a measure of its acceptance in the society. The *Wehrmacht* model of civil-military relations has further usefulness as a bench-mark because it is an extreme variant of civil-military relations.

Derivative of this bench-mark is the historical Prussian military culture. This military culture is described below under the label of "Reformist Prussian." The *Wehrmacht's* military culture built on and exaggerated certain elements of this earlier tradition. Nevertheless there are important differences that are outlined in the ideal-types. In light of the continuity of German political and military culture this earlier culture is important because it presents an alternative constellation of beliefs for the political elites to adopt in their perceptions of the military. Adoption of this constellation would also demonstrate the continuity of military culture.

By way of introductory synopsis, I study the development of elite orientations in their public statements on the reestablishment and development of civil-military relations in East and West Germany. The goal is to conduct a focused comparison through content analysis to determine the constellation of beliefs at the point of creation of armed forces and then again a decade later. The theoretical

underpinning of the hypothesis predicts that historical attitudes about the military will first exhibit "formlessness." This could be demonstrated by both non-traditional orientations to military culture, as well as, a marked variety in the types of orientations that the political elites express. The expectation is that, in the long term, a historical constellation of beliefs reasserts itself in both Germanies. Further, as these constellations develop they will converge or become more similar. The convergence occurs as their common historical political culture reasserts itself.

I selected beliefs about the military as a subset of political culture for two reasons. First, such beliefs must be explicit in order to give the soldier the ideals he is to honor. This is particularly important in the military, as the soldier is expected to give his life in the name of these ideals. Second, the recreation of military forces occurred in a rushed and threatening environment which caused political beliefs about the military to come to the forefront in a condensed time period.

Given this discussion, the dependent variable is the political culture, or specifically the political culture defined as a constellation of cognitions and evaluative beliefs the political elite in their leadership roles use to define the situation in which decisions about the military are made. The independent variable will be speculated upon in the final chapter. At this point it is already clear that further

research is required to determine the sources of motivations for change or continuity in political elites' statements.

### Definitions

The literature on political culture contains a consensus on what elements comprise political culture. These common elements are attitudes on how things ought to be, how things are, cognition of reality, and opinions about political subjects.<sup>3</sup>

Before beginning a detailed discussion of definitions of political culture it is important to provide a definition of culture. The definition used in this study is one provided by Eckstein: "The distinctive variable ways in which societies normatively regulate social behavior."<sup>4</sup> The justification for using this definition will become clear later.

The foundation of my definition of political culture comes from Sidney Verba. He defines it as consisting of "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Lawrence C. Mayer, Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Versus Performance, (London: Sage Publications, 1989): 184.

<sup>4</sup>Eckstein, 803.

<sup>5</sup>Sidney Verba, Political Development, 513.

This definition does not, however, provide an adequate foundation for an explanation of change in the political culture because the mechanism that causes political culture to be acquired or modified is not specified. For this reason I have adopted Eckstein's reasoning that there is variation among societies due to "culturally determined learning." He insists that the shared history of a society results in some shared predispositions and that if these predispositions are shared on a widespread basis they can be called "cultural themes."<sup>6</sup>

Eckstein goes further in his explanation of change in political culture. He outlines four postulates of cultural change that have direct bearing on this study. The **postulate of oriented action** provides orientations to action which are general dispositions of actors to act in certain ways in sets of situations. They are referred to as "orientations to action."<sup>7</sup> These orientations are the mediating element between stimulus and response in psychological models.

The **postulate of orientational variability** modifies the behavioralist assumptions built into the first postulate. This postulate accounts for the fact that subjective orientations are not mere subjective reflections of objective

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 792.

<sup>7</sup>Eckstein, 790.

conditions. Such orientations are not acquired in some axiomatic way and thus lead to the next postulate.<sup>8</sup>

The postulate of cultural socialization is the fashion in which the constellations of cognitions, feelings and schemes of evaluation are learned from external socializers.<sup>9</sup> This type socialization provides as a filter for the next postulate. Finally, the postulate of "cumulative" socialization provides for the need for economy of action in social interaction, as well as, the need for predictability in social interaction.<sup>10</sup> Early or prior socialization serves a filter for perception of later learning or socialization.

The test in this study involves the influence of external socializers in the form of the military tradition that is carried forward from one generation to another. This military tradition was experienced by the generation of political elites that acted to recreate the militaries in both Germanies. Further, the generation that provided the a new set of conscripts also experienced an earlier military tradition. They bring their own orientation to the military with them. Eckstein's postulates allow the political elites to respond to and learn from the demands of this new generation through cumulative socialization. The definition of military tradition that I use is Donald Abenheim's

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 790.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 791.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

definition of military culture, "...the sum of attitudes, customs, and symbols of military life that succeeding generations have preserved and adapted in armies over time."<sup>11</sup>

The aim of this study is thus to determine if the effect of societal disruption in Germany prevents this military tradition, and the forms of civil-military relations it provides, from reasserting themselves in the political culture of the political elite. Does this disruption cause the political elites to perceive a *tabla rosa*?

Operationalization of variables requires more specificity than that provided by these definitions. There has to be foundation on which to ground orientations that the postulate of oriented action calls for. For this reason I use Samuel Huntington's discussion of civil-military relations to provide a more detailed set of tools for examining the political elite's orientation to the military.<sup>12</sup> His analysis is valuable both when applied to the definition of culture provided above, as well as when it is applied to the definition of military tradition. This is because his analysis focuses on the normative aspects of the officer's profession, as well as its historical foundation. Huntington's approach is further validated by the fact that

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<sup>11</sup>Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988): 13.

<sup>12</sup>Samuel Huntington, The Soldier, the State and Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

there is no way to measure the actual combat effectiveness of the German forces that were created in the 1950's. The real issue is the relationship of the military to the state and the society.<sup>13</sup>

Huntington describes the military officer as a professional having three attributes. The first attribute is expertise. The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill which require prolonged education and experience. This expertise is grounded in an historical evolution of knowledge that is intellectual, and preserved in writing, as well as being a segment of the total cultural tradition of society.<sup>14</sup> What aspects of this expertise are recognized, and which aspects are rejected by the political elites in the Germanies? How does the political culture interpret the value of military expertise?

The second aspect is responsibility. The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, performing a service which is essential to the functioning of society. Society is the professional's client. Some statement governs and regulates his relationship to society. Thus his profession becomes a moral unit positing certain values and ideals which guide its members in their dealing with laymen. It may be codified or unwritten.<sup>15</sup> This is of

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<sup>13</sup>Abenheim, 7.

<sup>14</sup>Huntington, 9.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 10.



particular importance in the Germanies given the precedents set by the *Reichswehr* and the *Wehrmacht*. Where do elites see the responsibilities of the military lying? Should this responsibility turn inward, to the military, or outward, to the society or state, or to a supranational entity?

The third aspect is corporateness. The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This is based on the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence. There is a written code of ethics which is formalized and enforces the standards of professional responsibility governing conduct toward society.<sup>16</sup> The question for the Germanies is, how much corporateness can be tolerated? The German historical legacy is one of the military becoming a state within the state, or even resting above it and the society. How do the elites in the two Germanies reconcile the need for corporateness with the need for permeable boundaries between the military and society?

These conceptions of civil-military relations form a set of continuums that describe all the possible variants of civil-military relations. These continuums are customized to fit the case of the two Germanies.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 10.

Chart 1: Civil-Military Relations

	Wehrmacht Advocate	Reformer <sup>17</sup>	Ahistorical	Stalinist	Pacifist
Expertise	Wehrmacht based	Pre-Wehrmacht Prussian	All new	Soviet model	Not needed
Responsibility	To the military	To the military and the state	To the state	To the people	Military cannot be responsible
Corporateness	Nonpermeable boundary	Semi-permeable boundary	Permeable boundary	No boundary	Corporateness corrupts

Both the military tradition of the Germans as well as the debates that occurred in the 1950's have definable orientations to each of the aspects of aspects of civil-military relations. These three elements of civil-military relations define the debate in the two Germanies and provide a means to measure the orientations of the political elite as well as change in them.

Framework for Deductive Theory  
on Change in Political Culture

How change in political culture occurs is hypothesized by Harry Eckstein. Socialization or prior learning reasserts itself in spite of attempts to change constellations of

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<sup>17</sup>The reformer exists in West Germany as the Prussian Reformer, and in East Germany as the Marxist-Leninist Reformer. These ideal-types are discussed in greater detail in a later section.

beliefs. Change does occur, but some fundamental elements instilled by socialization will resurface after any societal disruption or political revolution.<sup>18</sup> In the case of the Germanies, the socialization of the political elites and the soldiers they lead is hypothesized to have this effect. There is also the possibility that the socialization of younger generations plays a role given the fact that their parents wore the uniforms of the *Wehrmacht*.

Further, Eckstein's framework allows the political elites to learn.<sup>19</sup> This occurs through later life socialization in the form of the elite's experience with developing new cadres. The experience of creating new armed forces influences their perceptions. Thus, as the militaries develop and show signs of spontaneously reacquiring some their historical traditions, the elites should have the ability to incorporate these lessons into their perceptions.

Eckstein postulates three phases in political culture's reassertion in a disrupted society. First, a "formlessness" appears as the culture loses, or has lost, its coherent structure. His culturalist assumptions deny any possibility of rapid long-term reorientation.<sup>20</sup> The psychological need for predictability in social interaction cannot be replaced quickly. Short-term reorientation of the

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<sup>18</sup>Eckstein, 792-794.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 791.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 796.

constellation of beliefs in the political culture can occur in the next stage. Eckstein describes this in terms of retreatist, or self-serving, conformity. In the case of politically engineered transformation "legalism" can result. Legalism is defined as brute force used to enforce external legal prescriptions in place of traditional practices. Another possibility in this stage is rebellion.<sup>21</sup> Reassertion of some aspects of the historical political culture follows. This is due to the prerequisites for economy of action and social predictability.<sup>22</sup> The upshot is that real change in constellations of beliefs can only occur in the long-term, and unforced course of societal evolution.

Eckstein considers both cultural discontinuity and politically engineered change in the culture. The former is the result of war or large social upheaval. This was clearly the case in both Germanies. The latter also occurred in both Germanies. Eckstein calls it political transformation and defines it as "the use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures."<sup>23</sup>

While Eckstein describes these dynamics as existing in the society in general, the assumption here is that similar

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 797.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 798.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 798.

patterns would be reflected in the elites of the countries undergoing the societal disruption.

### Level of Analysis

This study looks at the conceptual orientations of the political elite in East and West Germany. The focus is on an abstract level and will not look at more specific aspects of what actual drill and ceremony, or cut of the uniform were adopted. Rather, I look at the theoretical approaches to the role of the military in society and the historical foundations the military should rest on. This may involve specific discussions of military customs and usages, but will not consider what is implemented. This approach is validated by the fact that in the West German case, arguments about such details generally resulted in more philosophical debates about the history of German military traditions.<sup>24</sup> In similar fashion, in the East German case the philosophical debates revolved around Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the German experience.

This study will concentrate on the micro level of military culture. That is, it will focus on the statements of individuals for a determination of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values. However, this study does provide a link between the micro and macro levels of analysis

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<sup>24</sup>Abenheim, 6.

that studies of political culture generally can provide. The statements of military elites have direct institutional impact. Further, political elites are aware that they need military forces that are willing to fight.

### Historical Context

The historical context is important for understanding the constraints within which both sets of German decision-makers acted. The event that initiates the superpowers' drive to rearm the Germanies is the Korean War. Both superpowers perceived the need for additional forces on the European continent due to their commitments to Korea and the escalating Cold War. As a result the Germanies were pressured to quickly provide sizeable forces. In the mid-1950's the West's plan was to create a European military force and not a German national force. In the West German case Konrad Adenauer's acquiescence in providing a German contingent to a European force surprised his own government as well as the German people.<sup>25</sup>

The plans for a pan-European armed force faltered and finally failed. During this time the West German military planners moved slowly. Once the decision for a national army was made the planning once again went into high gear.<sup>26</sup> This

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 75-78.

planning was not, however, in the context of a public debate. It was behind the scenes if no other reason than it violated the Treaties of Paris.<sup>27</sup> Analyses of this era uniformly indicate that questions of military tradition were not considered, and were largely ignored by military and political planners.<sup>28</sup>

The official decision to create an armed force in East Germany was made in 1952. There were, however, already over 100,000 people under arms in para-military-type organizations by 1950. These units were eventually turned into regular armed forces.<sup>29</sup> As in West Germany the question of the appropriate tradition for these forces was not considered in-depth at the early stages of planning. Instead the Soviet template was adopted.<sup>30</sup>

Internally, politicians in both Germanies faced pacifists and prior promises not to rearm. Externally they faced a Europe and a Soviet Union that were fearful of large German military forces. There was a great apprehension of a revival of German militarism. This was because the efficacy

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 43 and 50.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 49-52. The needs of creating a military tradition were subsumed in the concept of Pan-Europeanism in West Germany, defining it simply as remaining at the forefront of progressive European social policy.

<sup>29</sup>David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's Ally, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983): 270-271.

<sup>30</sup>Thomas M. Forster, The East German Army: The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980): 26-34.

of the new Germany democracy in the West and the new German socialism in the East, was still in question. The dilemma for both Germanies was whether new civil-military relations could be created that were effective, and did not arouse the fears of their neighbors. To solve this predicament armies of a new type were to be created. These armies should not reflect the negative connotations of Hitler's *Wehrmacht*, and should still motivate soldiers. These armies should support their governments without lapsing into threatening neighboring states.

The West German *Bundeswehr* was founded on 12 November, 1955. This was the 200th birthday of Scharnhorst, the Prussian reformer. This was no coincidence. There was a conscious symbolism to link the *Bundeswehr* with his reform movement.<sup>31</sup> Scharnhorst's reform was a new start, and not tradition-based. The initial posture of the West German political elites is described as non-traditional in secondary sources.<sup>32</sup>

The *Nationale Volksarmee* was founded by the East German parliament on January 18, 1956. At this point in time there were already over 120,000 men under arms in the country.<sup>33</sup> In curious fashion the uniform and style of drill

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<sup>31</sup>Abenheim, 166.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 166, and Herbert Roskinski, The German Army, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966): 296.

<sup>33</sup>Forster, 26.



and ceremony selected was that of the *Wehrmacht*. This symbolism was combined with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and was apparently designed to improve the image of a very unpopular force.<sup>34</sup> The early para-military units had similar uniforms and style which were then changed to Soviet-type styles and organizations. This style then changed again and reverted to *Wehrmacht* styles.<sup>35</sup> This early waffling, at least symbolically, demonstrates that some kind of debate was occurring in East Germany.

Although it was not openly acknowledged by both Germanies, the bulk of their cadres were of *Wehrmacht* origin.<sup>36</sup> This had several important influences. First, these cadres often insisted on the honorable nature of their past service. This was expressed in West Germany by governmental recognition of their service in the form of awards for service in the *Wehrmacht*.<sup>37</sup> Second, it caused continued attention to be paid to the proper relationship between the military and the state. Should the state trust the military? Could the state honor the professionalism of these new forces?

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Abenheim, 44. In East Germany most of the worst elements of the *Wehrmacht* were purged. Forster, 18-22. In West Germany there were boards which selected officers, "...on the basis of their democratic attitudes as well as the technical skill."

<sup>37</sup>Childs, 275.

In East Germany, the stress inside the military seems to have been on pure Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the military culture. This stress down-played the importance of a home-grown German tradition, with a preference for relying on the Soviet example and Marxist dogma. The result was called the "school of hatred" in the West. The East Germans' interpretation of anti-imperialism led them to attempt to instill hatred for the Western 'imperialists.'<sup>38</sup> This is certainly not a dogma based on German tradition.

In the West German case the doctrine adopted was *Innere Führung*. This doctrine attempts to avoid the question of a valid tradition for the West German armed forces.<sup>39</sup> It is a noncommittal doctrine due to its lack of specificity regarding the role civil-military relations in the *Wehrmacht* era played in the demise of the *Weimar* Republic. The drafters avoided references to history.<sup>40</sup> The American-type uniform adopted is a reflection of such an ahistorical approach.<sup>41</sup>

During the first decade of their existence several events took place that raised the visibility of the debate over appropriate civil-military relations. Within two years of the formation of these two militaries units independently

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<sup>38</sup>Forster, 47-49.

<sup>39</sup>Abenheim, 44-45.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 11-47. The source of doctrine for *Innere Führung* was the Himmerod Memorandum which is also referred to the Magna Carta of the *Bundeswehr*.

<sup>41</sup>Childs, 274.

started assuming the traditions of various historical German units. There was competition between East and West Germany in the race to appropriate unit lineages.<sup>42</sup> This called into question the efficacy of continued pacific civil-military relations. There were fears that the military was beginning to reestablish the kinds of corporateness that had separated it from society under the Nazis. Further there were fears that if honor were brought to the legacy of the *Wehrmacht* that militarism would soon follow.

The invasion of Hungary must have raised the specter of an actual use of military force. For the political elites one must assume that this event moved the issue of civil-military relations from the realm of academic debate to one of national survival.

Further, it is safe to assume that the physical division of the two Germanies in 1961 provided another impetus. In addition, during the mid-1960's the race between the East and West German militaries to adopt the lineages and honors of historical German and Prussian units accelerated. There are no open sources that discuss how this was handled in East Germany. They clearly tolerated it, if not condoned it, simply because units continued the practice. In West Germany there was heated debate.

Also in West Germany, the government continued to grapple with the issue of tradition in the form of a drive to

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<sup>42</sup>Abenheim, 176.

legislate it. There were on-going attempts to codify the appropriate traditional foundation of the new *Bundeswehr*.<sup>43</sup> There was considerable political backlash from the decree that was finally adopted in 1965.<sup>44</sup> This decree, in a fashion similar to the underlying principles of *Innere Führung*, continued to avoid honoring the "honorable" contributions of the *Wehrmacht*. This brought heated dissent from veterans groups.

There were other changes that had been brought by time. In the late 1950's most Germans were convinced of the need to defend themselves. By the late 1960's this Cold War consensus had started to break down.<sup>45</sup> A new era of confrontation and decision-making about the proper role of the military started in West Germany. The conflict became acute with the assumption of power of Helmut Schmidt.<sup>46</sup>

In East Germany, during the 1960's, dogmatic Marxist doctrine on civil-military relations appears to have had continued influence. The nature of the political system probably did not allow the kind of open debate that existed in the West. I can only assume that some kind of debate must have existed given some of the events described above.

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<sup>43</sup>Abenheim, 114.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 213.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 228.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 235-247.

An important aspect of the German military history is that in 1956 there had been an eleven year break in the existence of an active armed force. The inductees to the new forces were 7 to 10 years old at the end of the war.<sup>47</sup> How do the political elites perceive the issue of motivating these soldiers, and tying their loyalty to the state?

#### The Time period

I look at expressions of military culture starting with the creation of an active duty force in the two Germanies. The implication is that "applied" political culture is clearer reflection of political culture than constellations of beliefs that do not have to be applied to real military forces. For this reason the analysis starts with 1955-56 and the creation of armed forces in both countries.

The end point for studying the early development of military culture among the political elites must to some extent be arbitrary. Development and the learning associated with it never stops. Further, it is clear that the Germans had not solved the problem of the appropriate tradition for their armed force, nor have they solved it today.<sup>48</sup> There are two considerations in deciding on an ending point. First,

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<sup>47</sup>Gordon Craig in the introduction to Abenheim, xvi.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., xvii.

it is desirable to place it after the division of Germany in order to provide the opportunity for autonomous development. The second consideration is turnover in the political elite. The year 1969 brought a change in the political party governing West Germany. This new elites constellation of beliefs could (and did) have an entirely different orientation and cause. In East Germany, Walter Ulbricht was removed from power in 1971 and a new set of elites was brought to power.

For these reasons I have selected 1968 as the end point. Using this date allows measurement of changes in the constellations of beliefs of a relatively constant cohort of political elites. It also allows Eckstein's description of cumulative learning to have an impact. The new elites that took control in both countries can be assumed to require time to learn how to handle military forces in the pragmatic day-to-day sense as opposed to the rhetoric of politics in gaining power. There is one additional advantage to 1968 as an endpoint. The Warsaw's Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia took place in that year. This invasion, once again, raised the issue of the role of the military in society in both Germanies.

#### Variable Operationalization

The orientations German politicians bring to making decisions on military policy, as well as the orientations

existing in society, can be defined in terms of ideal-type constellations of beliefs. These constellations are concisely definable in terms of their approach to civil-military relations. I have outlined several ideal-type constellations of beliefs that typify the actors in the German political arena in the first decade of its existence. They are the "Wehrmacht advocate," the "Reformist Prussian," the "Ahistorical Reformist," the "Reformist Marxist-Leninist," the "Stalinist" and the "Pacifist." As a forward to these descriptions, I do not expect to find all of these ideal-types among the elite politicians. In West Germany I expect to find the Reformist Prussian and the Ahistorical Reformer as the primary representatives. In East Germany I expect to find the Stalinist and the Marxist-Leninist Reformer. The other ideal-types are nevertheless important for providing the context in which the debate over civil-military relations takes place.

The *Wehrmacht* advocate characterizes civil-military relations in terms of the military being superior to the state. War is idealized as an end unto itself. The military is perceived as a warrior caste with institutional values dominating those of the state. The source of tradition lies in the pre-reform ideals of the Prussians as well as in the *Wehrmacht*.<sup>49</sup>

Those advocating the *Wehrmacht* ideal-type in post-war Germany are typified by the ex-*Wehrmacht* officers that insist

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<sup>49</sup>Roskinski, 198-207; Abenheim, 16, and 33-40.

that the soldiers of the *Wehrmacht* should be honored.<sup>50</sup> They insist that the military did not play a large role in the atrocities of the Third Reich.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, they still carry much of the warrior caste mentality.<sup>52</sup> Obedience is a highly regarded virtue.<sup>53</sup> They do not advocate the idea that the soldier is a normal part of society. For example, they do not see him as voting or as being a member of political parties.<sup>54</sup> The soldier is separate from society.<sup>55</sup> In terms of Huntington's description of a professional, their conception is one of high regard for the expertise and responsibility of the officer of the *Wehrmacht*, and high value placed on tight corporateness in the military.

The *Wehrmacht* ideal-type is only visible in the West German public debate.<sup>56</sup> In the case of the East German politicians and military I can only presume their influence

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<sup>50</sup>Abenheim, 65-68, 70-71.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 16. The Prussian-German tradition that set war above politics is represented by such personalities as Alfred von Schlieffen, Erich Ludendorff, Hans von Seeckt, Kurt von Schleicher, Werner von Blomberg and Wilhelm Keitel. Ibid., 48. The military is to have an exclusive position in the state.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>54</sup>Abenheim, 18. Instead there is an adherence to the idea of the soldier as belonging to an order harking back to medieval chivalry.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>Their feelings were expressed through the existence of veterans' organizations which exercised influence in local military posts.



given the adoption of the *Wehrmacht* uniform and drill and ceremony style in the *Nationale Volksarmee*. This occurred in spite of a reportedly deep purge of *Wehrmacht* officers.<sup>57</sup>

The Reformist Prussian ideal-type is found in West Germany. This type of thinker sees civil-military relations as characterized by the democratization of the military.<sup>58</sup> The military is subordinate to the state as well as its partner in defense of democracy.<sup>59</sup> The source of tradition lies in the reformist period of Prussian military development.<sup>60</sup>

Reformist Prussians are often ex-officers of the *Wehrmacht*, but they are also academicians. Foremost among these officers is Wolf Count Baudissin.<sup>61</sup> They do not

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<sup>57</sup>Forster, 26. The purge was the result of the 1953 uprisings in East Germany. The East German military played a very ineffectual role in controlling the rioting.

<sup>58</sup>Abenheim, 4. Citations of historical examples by the German military academicians center on King Frederick William III of Prussia. He glorified the German military's role in liberation from Napoleon, as well as the democratization of the military, in the early 19th century.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid. The defense of democracy is grounded in the actions of German officers in their resistance to Hitler. The symbol used is the attempted assassination of Hitler in 20 July, 1944.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 19. Included in this heritage is the military leader of the Prussian reform, Scharnhorst. Ibid., 3. Additionally Grolman, Boyen, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz are cited.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 5. Wolf Count Baudissin was a central player in the academic debate over tradition in the ne West German military. His approach was that the important threads of German tradition had passed through Nazi Germany as though it was a vacuum. The implication being that tradition could be

consider the *Wehrmacht* to be a legitimate example of German military history, but an aberration Hitler created. They cite the democratic tradition handed down by Prussian reformers of the early 19th century. They do not see a contradiction between being a soldier and being part of a democracy, because the soldier's obedience is not to be "robot-like," but a willing subordination to the military unit.<sup>62</sup> The ideal-type is the "citizen in uniform."<sup>63</sup> In terms of Huntington's conception the Reformist Prussian regards expertise as deriving from the Prussians and not the *Wehrmacht*. The responsibility of the officer was corrupted by Hitler, but still contains validity. This thought is based on the Prussian example, as well as, the coup directed against Hitler on 20 July, 1944. The corporateness of the military must be tempered by civil responsibility, as it was in the Prussian example.

This category of ideal-type is prominent enough for Abenheim to give them the label "traditionalist."<sup>64</sup> They are not, however, winners in the initial academic debate over military traditions as described above. The lack of

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drawn from German history.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 17-18 and 44-45. *Innere Führung* was to provide a means to mediate the conflict between the soldiers' rights and military requirements.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 45. The creator of this phrase was Theodor Blank. He was in control of what was called the *Amtstelle Blank*, the early planning headquarters of the *Bundeswehr*.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

prominence of this category as well as the previous type in the East German case may be explainable through the purges of *Wehrmacht* officers mentioned above. There is a similar ideal type in the East German case. It is the Marxist-Leninist Reformer described below.

The Ahistorical Reformer has his roots in the *Reichswehr* formative years when a new and non-historical military culture was the goal.<sup>65</sup> Civil-military relations are characterized by domination of the state to a degree that had not existed previously in German history.<sup>66</sup> Further, the state is to engineer the reconstruction of the military in the image the state desires.<sup>67</sup> The source of tradition for the new *Bundeswehr* is to be ahistorical, and the defeat of the *Wehrmacht* is considered a "zero-hour;" an opportunity for an entirely new start.<sup>68</sup> Traditions were initially based on pan-Europeanism. The new German military was to be a "school of Europe."<sup>69</sup> The military is to be purely defensive. There is a rejection of all prior military culture as defined by Abenheim. In terms of Huntington civil-military relations,

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<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 48-49.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 80.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 89-91.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., 12-13, and 49-50.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 97 and 100. This conception was combined with the idea of an "army without pathos." These ideas are reflections of a generalized skepticism over the value of tradition.

expertise is defined strictly on technical merits and not leadership of troops or the on historical basis of such expertise. Responsibility rests on the primacy of the civic responsibility of the soldier to state and society, and not the military. Corporateness is defined as common purpose not blind obedience with a strong emphasis on not allowing the military to develop a strong corporate identity.<sup>70</sup>

This category exists in West Germany and there are both officers and civilians in this category. In academic circles this group seems to be predominant in the debate at the point in time at which the armed forces are created in West Germany. It is my judgement that this category fits Eckstein's description of "formlessness." The planners thought they could avoid the difficulties associated with military traditions by simply avoiding them. Abenheim calls this category the "reformers."<sup>71</sup>

The Marxist-Leninist Reformer's conception of civil-military relations is one of the military serving the interests of the working class and is derived from progressive officers in German military history.<sup>72</sup> The military is to fight for the working class. This tradition is founded on the peasant wars of the 16th century with the likes of Rohrbach,

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 98.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., 6. The military reformers at the point of creation of the West German military vowed to create something completely new.

<sup>72</sup>Childs, 284.

Eisenhut and Geismayer.<sup>73</sup> The sources of tradition continue with men like Gnesinaw and other officers of the Prussian tradition that could be interpreted as having fought in the interest of the working or peasant class in later centuries.<sup>74</sup> The expertise of the Prussian officer is recognized as an appropriate template. The officer corps is regarded as being capable of acting responsibly toward the working class. Corporateness in the form of a cohesive fighting force is granted on the basis of the Prussian example of the soldier serving the people and responsible to the people.

This category is found in East Germany and parallels the category of Prussian Reformists in important ways. Tradition is historical and based inside of Germany. There is an attempt to reconcile the contradictions between being part of Soviet communism and being German.<sup>75</sup>

The Stalinist assumes the civil-military policy posture of the Soviet Union's communists. Relations are characterized by domination of the worker in the form of the worker's state. Thus there is no division between the military and the state as both consist of the working class.

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<sup>73</sup>Ibid., 284. These peasant leaders fought against the professional officers and soldiers of the feudal lords.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 284.

<sup>75</sup>Reinhard Bruhl, "Zur Erbe und Tradition in der Deutschen Militargeschichte," in Tradition und Erbe in der DDR, Helmut Meier and Walter Schmidt, eds., (Koln: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag GmbH, 1989): 253-264.

Military tradition is not national but international in character.<sup>76</sup> Tradition is to be derived from solidarity with international socialist movements and their survival, and not parochial or nationalistic sources.<sup>77</sup> Further, the Soviet historical example is the template for military development not the German experience. In order to grapple with the history of German aggression toward the Soviet Union an intense indoctrination of hatred was instituted. This intensity was to cover the inherent difficulty the East Germans faced in potentially fighting their West German brethren.<sup>78</sup>

This category is found only in East Germany and is the off-spring of the Soviet Union's dogmatic Stalinists. Expertise is derived from the Soviets with a denial of the German traditional expertise.<sup>79</sup> The responsibilities of the officer corps are based on obligations to the working class and the Soviet Union. There is little acknowledgement of corporateness as the officer corps as it is to be comprised of the working class as well as remaining a part of it. In other words, there is little allowance for the kinds of professionalism that Huntington calls for in an officer cadre.

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<sup>76</sup>Forster, 17.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 17 and 29.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., 47-49.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., 19.

The Pacifist sees civil-military relations with revulsion for all things military. Peace is the first, and only goal. The pacifist exists in both East and West Germany. Possession of a military force is seen as a moral wrong. Tradition is considered an inevitable source of aggressive militarism among Germans.<sup>80</sup> The primary historical citation is the complicity of the German military in the rise of National Socialism.<sup>81</sup>

There were many in Germany that expressed the ideas of *ohne mich*.<sup>82</sup> While difficult to translate accurately, it means, "without me." The implication being that its adherents were apathetic, in general, and wanted nothing to do with German remilitarization, in specific. If Germany were to rearm, the pacifists called for a strictly defensive force that should be bound by declarations of the denial of the use of force. In West Germany, this idea of *Gewaltversicht* was very prevalent. There was widespread belief in the idea that dying without defending oneself was more honorable than recreating a German military. This idea was sharpened by the recognition that future wars would probably be of a civil-nuclear nature, with Germans inflicting Hiroshimas on each

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<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 44-45, Childs, 273, 278-280, Abenheim, 41-44.

<sup>81</sup>Abenheim, 5.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., 43. The originator of the idea behind this phrase was Carlo Schmid.

other.<sup>83</sup> This category appears to be an expression of Eckstein's retreatism.

The pacifist sees the German officer corps as the source of a tradition that is regressive in its orientation to society.<sup>84</sup> The officer corps is seen as overly bourgeoisie, arrogant, or conceited.<sup>85</sup> Military tradition and militarism are interchangeable in their vocabulary.<sup>86</sup> The military is seen as formalized barbarianism.<sup>87</sup>

To summarize, there is no need for expertise in a nuclear world of total destruction. The German officer corps is inevitably acts irresponsibly toward the German people and world peace. The corporateness of any military, and particularly the German military inevitably corrupts the civil responsibilities of its members. Peace is the only rational and honorable goal for the Germans.

These summaries provide a general outline of ideal-type characterizations of the dependent variable. It is important to note that these characterizations are derived from secondary sources that deal with the military and not the political elites. This study seeks to determine where the political elites stand, and if there is movement over time

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<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 14-15.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., 15.



from the less traditional ideal-types to the more tradition-bound types. Greater specificity will be introduced to these ideal-types when a framework for analysis is established later in this chapter.

The hypothesis that I have presented proposes that political culture will initially tend toward the ahistorical and negative types of conceptions of civil-military relations. These include the Pacifist, Stalinist and Ahistorical Reformer constellations of beliefs. With time the Reformist Prussian, Reformist Marxist-Leninist, and *Wehrmacht* constellations of beliefs should reassert themselves if the hypothesis is to be confirmed.

### The Elites

While this study looks at specific and named individual elites, the underlying intention is to analyze expressions of political culture that are contained in the roles that they play. The basis for selection of elites is thus based on the offices they fill. It is assumed that these roles or offices force the individuals to express conceptions of civil-military relations, as well as be a reflection of the political culture they are a part of.

I look at the statements of four sets of elites. The difficulties inherent in studying communist regimes are central factors in deciding which elites to study. There are

limited data available on policy-making in the Communist block countries. The opposite is true in the case of West Germany. As a result the constrained nature of the information available from East Germany largely determines the scope of the analysis.

In East Germany the Communist Party first secretary is the object of study. He is the *de facto* holder of power. In West Germany the Chancellor's role is the object of analysis. He plays the role of leading the democracy. This leading politician provides important and symbolic leadership values to the military. In both of these countries the leading politicians would be, at a minimum, the symbolic leaders of the armed forces in times of armed conflict. Through their communications in peace-time they play a large role in defining the role of the soldier and officer in society.

The second most important individual role in defining the military in society is held by the minister of defense. In his role this minister takes the political decisions of the state and implements the construction, and maintenance of the armed force. The role of minister of defense is most likely to address questions of civil-military relations as he sits at the intersection of the political system and the military. His statements have great impact on, and are a reflection of, the military in society.

The elites looked at in East Germany in the initial period are Walter Ulbricht, the First Secretary of the SED and

Willi Stoph, the minister of defense. In West Germany in the initial period the subjects are Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and defense minister Franz-Josef Strauss.

In the second period the elites looked at in East Germany are, again, Walter Ulbricht and the defense minister Heinz Hoffmann. In West Germany the corresponding elites are Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and defense minister Gerhart Schroder.

### Control

The degree of control in this focused comparison is one of its greatest strengths. A high level of control is provided by the common historical background of the Germanies. As a result it is likely that the empirical beliefs and evaluations of the political elites are largely equivalent. In this fashion this case study overcomes the deep difficulties of equivalence that most studies of political culture confront. This study is temporally parallel as well.

Both countries were dominated by superpowers that attempted to influence the political elites to adopt their respective political culture. This helps to identify ideal-type orientations as well as make any reassertion of "German" political culture more important in terms of the hypothesis of this study.

Another important aspect is the physical geographic separation after 1961. This helps to sharpen the political dialogue as well as ensure that this study is looking at two cases that have separate internal development.

An important element of control revolves around the nature of the post-war German political environment. Both the superpowers as well as the a large segment of the German population did not desire a resurgence of German aggressive militarism. This causes the elites in both Germanies to carefully consider the impact of the decisions they made regarding the nature of their militaries. They could not easily assert the values of the *Wehrmacht*, or any other type of revisionist thought.

In both Germanies there was great pressure to rapidly create sizable military forces. This put a premium on concise and effective decision-making on civil-military relations. The fact that decisions had to be made rapidly helps to bring to the forefront the constellations of beliefs the politicians hold.

Further, the policy-makers were acting in a threatening environment. The Cold War was in full swing and a series of crises over the German question in the time period covered by this study impelled the decision-makers to consider how civil-military relations impacted on the effectiveness of the forces they were creating. Thus their perceptions were sharpened and

confronted by the need to learn to cope with a difficult environment.

As in any study in social science there are large areas of lack of control. In this case there are several as well. First, there was a difference in the degree of superpower domination, with the Soviet Union remaining more influential in the development of the East German military than in the West.

The initial lack of geographic separation creates a problem as the politicians were not sure of these legitimacy. Another difference lies in the democratic and socialist political systems. There was debate in West Germany. As a result the statements of the political elites are more likely to reflect their personal constellation of beliefs as affected by the public debate. In East Germany there was a more dogmatic adherence to beliefs. As a result it is likely that statements reflect a greater degree of adherence to dogma there which may hide changes in personal attitudes, and are unlikely to reflect the affects of public debate.

There is a final lack of control in the selection of elites to analyze. Each one brings a constellation of beliefs to their role that is unique. Further, their background can fundamentally distort the outcome of content analysis. A more thorough analysis than this one would take into consideration the biographic background of each leaders when interpreting

the results of content analysis. The scope of this study does not include such an individualistic psychological adjustment.

### Primary material selection

Justification of use of political elite statements is largely due to the lack of any public debate or available documentation of internal governmental or academic debate in East Germany. The debate that occurred in West Germany is well documented in archival material and personal interviews. In the East German case only the released statements of the political elites are available, at this point.

I will use public statements for two reasons. First they are more likely to reflect the thoughtful sentiments of the speaker and not just the rhetoric that is sometimes used in private debate. Second, such statements are planned or at least have been reflected upon as to their impact on the audience. As a result, such statements are likely to reflect a policy orientation that the politician has consciously decided on, as well as one that will motivate the audience. I believe that it is realistic to assume that political elites realize the importance of their statements to a new and developing military.

Sources of documents were selected with several criteria in mind. First, they were judged to be important sources of information. This means that if the elites in

question decide to communicate their views they would use the selected means. Basically the implication of this criteria is that authoritative sources are used. They must be sources in which the statements of elites are conveyed reliably.

A second consideration is the use of the selected sources by experts in academic fields of study. I limited the sources I use to those that are used by specialists that study the political systems of the two Germanies.

Finally, the documents had to provide *verbatim* transcripts of the communication by the elite. Communications that were in the form of synopses were rejected due to the potential bias that the editor could bring to the text.

The documents gathered for this study were derived from three basic types of sources. The first are published compilations of a specific elite's statements. This category applies to Ulbricht, Kiesinger, and Adenauer. There are several compilations that were reviewed and all statements that addressed civil-military relations were included in this study.<sup>88</sup> The second are compilations of important statements made by German politicians and military men that have been

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<sup>88</sup>Included here are: Gunter Buchstab, ed., Adenauer: "Wir Haben Wirklich etwas Geschaffen." Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1953-1957, (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1990); Gerhard Kiesinger, Stationen, (Tubingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1969); Walter Ulbricht, On Questions of Socialist Construction, (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1968); Walter Ulbricht, Whither Germany, (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1966); Konrad Adenauer: Reden 1917-1967, Eine Auswahl, (Stuttgart: Hans-Peter Schwarz Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975); Hans Jurgen Kusters, ed., Adenauer: Rhondorfer Ausgabe Teegesprache, 1955-1958, (Siedler Verlag, 1986).

published in East and West Germany. All available compilations were screened and all statements that covered aspects of civil-military relations were selected.<sup>89</sup> The final source was a public periodical. The periodical screened was Der Spiegel for West Germany. Der Spiegel was screened for the entire periods identified in this study, and all statements by the selected elites that covered civil-military relations were included in the content analysis.

The use of statements by elites present a host of difficulties and advantages. The weakness of using elite statements include the fact that they may not reflect learning from the views of the mass of soldiers. They may also only reflect the parochial interests of the officers, or the politicians themselves.

The most pertinent statements may be missed or not available. Further, statements may be made for purposes that cannot be understood without immersion into the context of the time and audience. It is clear that much was said in public for consumption in the "other" Germany.

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<sup>89</sup>Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989); Ernst Deuerlein, ed., Dokumente zur Deutschland Politik, (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1961); Lothar Lippmann and Hans Dietrich Moschutz, eds., Das System der sozialistischen Gesellschafts- und Staatsordnung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: Dokumente, (Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1969); Documents on the National Policy of the GDR, (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1969); Documents on the National and International Policy of the GDR, (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1969); Deutsches Bundestag, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages.



Finally, there is a degree of judgement that the analyst has to apply to any content analysis. The interpretive guides that will be discussed in the next chapter have an element of "softness" that is unavoidable.

### Framework for Analysis

Operationalization of variables for content analysis flows from the previous discussion of ideal-types. What follows are more concise statements of the qualitative presentation of the ideal-types discussed above. First, it is necessary to define the terms used.

The definition of cognition is information that is cited as fact in the arguments or statements made regarding the proper tradition or culture that the military should be consistent with. The definition of evaluation is based on the value judgements made about events or facts that form the basis of the argument or discussion about the appropriate tradition or culture for the military.

The analysis must be broken into two parts. The debate over military culture takes place in both East and West Germany. The parameters of the debates internal to the two Germanies have important differences. There is, at the same time, an important similarity based on common development. The differences have a significant impact on the nature of the debate as well as the outcome.

In the West German case there is a continuum in the debate that ranges from the assertions of the ex-*Wehrmacht* officers to the extreme pacifists. The non-traditional reformers and reformist Prussian ideal types lie in between these two extreme ideal-types.

In the East German case there is also a continuum in the debate but it ranges more narrowly between the arch-Stalinist and the reformist Marxist-Leninist. The pacifists are included as an ideal type, but they are not considered a part of the open debate due to its closed nature in East Germany.

#### Operationalization of West German Ideal Types

##### *Wehrmacht* Advocate

##### **Cognitions on Expertise**

1. Citations of the honorable contributions of the German military, to include the *Wehrmacht*.
2. Citation of the need to recognize the positive contributions of the *Wehrmacht*.

##### **Cognitions on Responsibility**

1. Citation of the positive moral qualities of the *Wehrmacht* officers.
2. Citation of the fact that *Wehrmacht* officers were just following orders.

3. Citation of the 20th of July 1944 as treasonous.

**Cognitions on Corporateness**

1. Citations of the need to honor past military awards.
2. Citations of the need for deep unity, cohesiveness, and discipline in the military.

**Evaluations of Expertise**

1. Positive evaluation of the competence of the *Wehrmacht* officer
2. Positive evaluation of the *Wehrmacht* as a valid part of German military culture.

**Evaluations of Responsibility**

1. Evaluation of the German military as justly superior to the state.
2. Evaluation of the German military as morally and justly superior to society.
3. Evaluation of war as an end unto itself.

**Evaluations of Corporateness**

1. Evaluation of obedience and discipline in the military as foremost soldierly values.
2. Positive evaluations of strong boundaries between the military and society.
3. Evaluation of the military as a state within the state.

### The Reformist Prussian

#### **Cognitions on Expertise**

1. Citation of positive contributions of the Prussian military.
2. Citation of the professional expertise of the Prussian officer.
3. Citation of the need for expertise based on the history of the German military, minus the *Wehrmacht*.

#### **Cognitions on Responsibility**

1. Citation of the Prussian reforms of the early 19th century particularly the democratic reforms.
2. Citation of the social responsibility of the Prussian officer to his societal client.
3. Citation of the democratic values of the Prussian officers.
4. Citation of the generally high sense of responsibility of the German officer corps.
5. Citation of the aberrant nature of the loss of responsibility of the *Wehrmacht* officer corps.
6. Citation of the honor of the 20th of July 1944.

#### **Cognitions on Corporateness**

1. Citation of the need for Prussian tradition in the military meaning a military that is part of, and not separate from society.

2. Citation of a balance between cohesiveness and service to the military and service to society

#### **Evaluations of Expertise**

1. High praise for the historical lessons of the Prussians' ability to be effective, as well as democratic.
2. Positive recognition of the Prussian tradition as a part of the entirety of German tradition.
3. Positive evaluation of the expertise of the German officer corps of the pre-*Wehrmacht* era.

#### **Evaluations of Responsibility**

1. Positive evaluation of the democratic relationship between the Prussian officer and German society.
2. Positive evaluation of the need and possibility of the German military to be a part of German democracy.
3. Positive evaluation of the possibility of having a responsible officer corps that uses traditionally defined bases of responsibility.

#### **Evaluations of Corporateness**

1. Evaluation of the military as a positive role model for society.
2. Evaluation of the military as subordinated to civilian control.
3. Positive evaluation of the "Citizen in Uniform."
4. Positive evaluation of the need for some boundaries between the military and society in general.

5. Positive evaluation of obedience tempered by responsibility.

### The Ahistorical Reformist

#### **Cognitions on Expertise**

1. Non-recognition or criticism of the value of the military's history.
2. Citation of the possibility of a total break with past military tradition and expertise.
3. Citation of the need for decrees to create a new tradition and an entirely new foundation for the military.
4. Citation of the centrality of technical expertise, not historical knowledge.
5. Citation of the need for defensive expertise and non-provocative military expertise.
6. Citation of the need for time to create a new military; to allow for time to create new psychological groundwork.

#### **Cognitions on Responsibility**

1. Citation of the tendency for responsibility to degrade in the officer corps.
2. Citation of the need to regulate the officer corps' legal basis.
3. Citation of the responsibility of the officer corps to defend Germany in the context of European defense.

**Cognitions on Corporateness**

1. Citation of German officers' responsibility to the military as damaging to society if uncontrolled.
2. Citation of past loyalty to the military as superseding loyalty to society if the officer corps is not legally controlled.
3. Citation of the need for a Pan-European military based on Pan-European values.
4. Citation of blind obedience and barracks brutality.

**Evaluations of Expertise**

1. Negative evaluation of the historical lessons of the German officer corps.
2. Positive evaluation of the possibility of creating a new ahistorical expertise.
3. Positive evaluation of the role of the Germany military as a component of a strong European defense force.

**Evaluations of Responsibility**

1. Negative evaluation of the history of the sense of responsibility of the German officer corps.
2. Positive evaluation of the possibility of creating a new basis for a sense of responsibility for the German officer corps.
3. Evaluation of the military culture as an "engineerable" entity.
4. Evaluation of the proper sense of responsibility of the German military as lying in the defense of Europe.

### **Evaluations of Corporateness**

1. Positive evaluation of a cohesive military as a potential part of a democracy.
2. Positive evaluation of the military as subordinate to civilian control.
3. Negative evaluation of the military's tendency to create a military state within German society.
4. Positive evaluation of highly permeable boundaries between the military and society.

### **The Pacifist**

#### **Cognitions on Expertise**

1. Rejection of German militarism to the point of expressions of pacifism, to include the ideas of "*ohne mich*."
2. Citation of the atrocities and destruction of the *Wehrmacht*, as well as the *Reichswehr*.
3. Citation of the need for a denial of the use of force, or *Gewaltversicht*.

#### **Cognitions on Responsibility**

1. Citation of the total lack of responsibility of the German officer corps.
2. Citation of the immoral quality of the German military's service to German society.
3. Citation of the irrationality war in an atomic environment.



**Cognitions on Corporateness**

1. Citation of the corruption of societal values that occurs inside a cohesive military organization.

**Evaluations of Expertise**

1. Negative moral evaluation of expertise in management of the use of force.
2. Negative evaluation of the use of force.
3. Negative evaluation of German military lessons and traditions.
4. Evaluation of the military as a potential necessary evil.

**Evaluations of Responsibility**

1. Negative evaluation of the possibility of social responsibility of any German officer corps.
2. Positive evaluation of a German society which is responsible through its rejection of all military force.
3. Evaluation of the military as requiring an explicit constraint to be imposed through denial of use of force, or *Gewaltversicht*.

**Evaluations of Corporateness**

1. Evaluation of the military as an inevitable source of negative German militarism.
2. Evaluation of the historical German officer a regressive element in German history that has retarded social development toward liberal ideals.

### Operationalization of East German Ideal Types

Here the first and last types, the *Wehrmacht* advocate and the Pacifist will not be repeated because they are the same as in the West German case.

#### The Marxist-Leninist Reformer

##### **Cognitions on Expertise**

1. Citation of positive contributions of selective progressive Prussian officers.
2. Citation of the professional expertise of the some progressive officers.
3. Citation of the expertise of past German officers.

##### **Cognitions on Responsibility**

1. Citation of past German military leaders that are considered responsible to the working or peasant class due to their combat against class domination.
2. Citation of the social responsibility of the Prussian officer to the working or peasant class.

##### **Cognitions on Corporateness**

1. Citation of the need for Prussian tradition in the military meaning a military that is part of, and not separate from society.
2. Citation of a balance between cohesiveness and service to the military and service to the working class.

**Evaluations of Expertise**

1. High praise for the historical lessons of some Prussians due to their effectiveness and social progressiveness.
2. Selective recognition of progressive military tradition.
3. Recognition of the possibility of creating a progressive new cadre of German officers.

**Evaluations of Responsibility**

1. Positive evaluation of some progressive relationships between officers and society.
2. Positive evaluation of the need and possibility of the German military to be a part of German socialism.
3. Positive evaluation of the anti-imperial nature of the actions of officers on 20 July 1944.

**Evaluations of Corporateness**

1. Evaluation of the German officer corps as a positive role model for society-wide socialism.
2. Evaluation of the military as subordinated to the working class control.
3. Positive evaluation of the need for some boundaries between the officer corps and society.
4. Positive evaluation of obedience tempered by responsibility for one's actions.

### The Stalinist

#### **Cognitions on Expertise**

1. Non-recognition of the German military's history.
2. Citation of a total break with military tradition and expertise which is to be replaced by the tradition of the Soviet Union.
3. Citation of the Soviet example as totally superseding the German experience.

#### **Cognitions on Responsibility**

1. Citation of the German officer's negative sense of class responsibility.
2. Citation of "inevitable" bourgeoisie responsibilities of German officers.
3. Citation of German imperialism and German military threats to communism.
4. Positive citation of the Soviet officer's sense of responsibility.

#### **Cognitions on Corporateness**

1. Citation of German officers' sense of responsibility as damaging to the cause of the working class.
2. Citation of past German loyalty to the military as superseding loyalty to the German and Russian working class.
3. Citation of the need for a Soviet-based military based on Soviet communism's values.

4. Citation of blind obedience and barracks brutality in the German officer corps.

#### **Evaluations of Expertise**

1. Negative evaluation of the historical class struggle lessons of the German military.
2. Positive evaluation of the possibility of creating a new German expertise based on the Soviet experience.

#### **Evaluations of Responsibility**

1. Negative evaluation of the sense of responsibility of German officers to workers.
2. Positive evaluation of the possibility of creating a new responsibility among German officers, based on the Soviet example.
3. Evaluation of the German military tradition as an "engineerable" entity based on historical materialism.

#### **Evaluations of Corporateness**

1. Positive evaluation the Soviet military as part of German socialism.
2. Positive evaluation of the German military as subordinate to working class control.
3. Negative evaluation of the German officer corps' tendency to create a military state within German society.
4. Positive evaluation of the need for highly permeable boundaries between the German officer corps and the German working class.

### The Issue

This chapter indicates that military tradition and civil-military relations were an issue for the political elites in both countries. The question posed by this study is how the political elites perception of the issue of civil-military relations formed, developed, and changed. Did they move toward adoption of traditional forms of such relations? The first decade of the existence of armed forces in both Germanies provide the events and the context to study the course that elite statements of political culture take after deep societal disruption and political discredit. Can a hypothesized initial non-traditional approach taken by the political elites in both countries be confirmed in their public statements? Do the political elites move in an ahistorical direction after a decade, or do they revert to more historical conceptions of civil-military relations?

## CHAPTER II

### CONTENT ANALYSIS CONSTRUCTION AND EXECUTION

#### Introduction

How do the elites filling important political roles in East and West Germany express their beliefs about civil-military relations? Does what they say change? If there is change in the expressed constellation of beliefs, what kind of change is it? These are the fundamental questions to be answered. Content analysis of elite statements must be tailored to uncover the answers to these questions, as well as, meet the requirements of scientific inquiry. Ole Holsti provides an invaluable guide to the construction of a research design that achieves these goals.<sup>90</sup> Before moving into the content analysis of German elite statements, I outline the procedures that are followed.

I use the definition of content analysis that Holsti provides: "...any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified

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<sup>90</sup>Ole Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and the Humanities, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

characteristics of messages."<sup>91</sup> Holsti outlines three requirements for effective content analysis. These are objectivity, system, and generality. These requirements are now addressed. Objectivity requires explicit rules and procedures which allow the analysis to be replicated.<sup>92</sup> This requirement is met in this study through objectively determined categories outlined in the German civil-military relations ideal-types covered in Chapter One. This requirement also calls for explicit rules governing the conduct of content analysis. This latter portion of the requirement is addressed later in this chapter.

System is the second requirement. This requirement calls for the inclusion of all applicable materials as part of the rules governing the content analysis.<sup>93</sup> This requirement is covered to the extent possible in this study through the use of all possible sources. I have reviewed personal memoirs, transcripts of parliamentary debate, transcripts of public speeches, and interviews in the popular media to include newspapers and magazines.

Generality is the last category of Holsti's requirements.<sup>94</sup> This requirement is met through grounding content analysis in the theoretical foundation that Eckstein

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 5.



provides for explaining change in political culture. This study adds to the literature on political change as it fits into Eckstein's framework for explaining such change. Further, it does so in a replicable, as well as, falsifiable manner.

### The Method

This study does not report the counting of or frequency of the appearance of symbols in elite statements. Further, a single system of enumeration is not appropriate here.<sup>95</sup> This is due to the differing manner in which the elites of the two countries discuss, or perceive their militaries. In West Germany the communications of the elites are familiar to the Western observer. In East Germany the communications are dominated by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist terminology. A count of symbols or words in these disparate political systems could result in two different compilations that would be difficult to compare directly.

Given this disparity, I rely on determining the thematic content of the statements as applied to the three major areas of civil-military relations. Holsti describes this method as "making a single qualitative judgement about

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<sup>95</sup>This refers to using a single set of symbols or expressions to measure elite statements.

the entire document."<sup>96</sup> In making this qualitative judgement there is, however, counting. In order for a document to qualify for inclusion into a particular category of civil-military relations the majority of citations contained in the document must fall within the description of that ideal-type. This did not present much difficulty as there were few documents that contained significant mixes of the various ideal-types.

Holsti's prescription of making a single qualitative judgement is modified to some extent. Instead of making a single judgement, this study makes three judgements, one for each component of Huntington's categorization of the elements of professionalism. The number of times a particular element occurs in a document will not be reported. The results will nevertheless be reported in a quantitative manner. After each document is judged on its orientation to civil-military relations the results are compiled in a master chart. This chart presents the results of all statement evaluations. The intent is to generate a snap-shot at the two points in time. There is a specific purpose in compiling the total number of times that elites cited a particular orientation. The higher the number of times the elite is evaluated to have shown a certain orientation toward civil-military relations the greater the reliability in concluding that his orientation has accurately been derived from his statements. This is opposed

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<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 7.

to treating a higher instance as an indicator of intensity.<sup>97</sup> I am not looking for changes in intensity. I am looking for fundamental change in the constellation of beliefs. Thus I am more interested in the reliability of observed changes not their intensity.

The theoretical basis for using this approach lies in my attempt to discover trends in perceptions on civil-military relations. A review of the primary sources indicates that coding of appropriate symbols to differentiate between the ideal types on a purely quantitative nature is not possible. This is because there are few universally available symbols, words, or phrases. Instead the elements identified under variable operationalization provide a generalized guide to the evaluating elite statements. This is due to the subtle nature of the changes that I am looking for. In the East German case doctrinal changes are significant in terms of small number changes. This is due to the dogmatic nature of the statements by the communist elites. In the West German cases, the public debate makes change a visible and very debateable event. There is a loss of precision in making individual judgements on elite statements, but I believe it is compensated for through an increase in the significance of the results. This is because it allows me to formulate categories into which scores of absent or present are recorded. The goal is to

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid.

uncover an "approximate answer to the a precise question as opposed to an exact answer to the wrong answer."<sup>98</sup>

Finally, the categories have been established with the purpose of uncovering trends in manifest content. This is due to the concern of measuring the information that is being transmitted to the audience, both the society as well as the military.

Intercoder reliability has been considered. In order to assure as high a degree of reliability as possible the following procedure was followed. Ten documents in the first third of the set of documents had duplicate coding sheets attached. These documents were coded as were all other documents. Just prior to completing the content analysis of all documents the ten selected documents were recoded without reference to the original coding. The results were positive. The same coding of civil-military orientations resulted. Therefore I have high confidence that my judgement of the elite's orientations to civil-military relations were not skewed in the process of coding.

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<sup>98</sup>Ibid., 12.

### The Content Analysis

The analysis proceeds by country. The results of content analysis are presented for the East German and then West German elites. In each case examples of typical statements for the categories are provided, as well as general discussion of the results of the content analysis. It should also be noted that the total number of codings in each of the civil-military categorizations will not equal the total number of documents coded. This is due to the fact that not all documents coded had references to military expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Comparisons of trends are discussed in Chapter Three.

### The East Germans: 1955-1958

This section covers Walter Ulbricht and Willi Stoph's statements for the initial period. Ulbricht and his defense minister Stoph reflect the effects of a Stalinist approach to civil-military relations.

In this initial snap-shot of elite perceptions of civil-military relations, Walter Ulbricht shows that he expressed the Stalinist line in the 1955 to 1958 period. Eight documents were coded.

Table 2: Walter Ulbricht

	W	R	S	P
Expertise	0	1	6	0
Responsibility	0	1	6	0
Corporateness	0	0	7	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation

R = Reformist Marxist-Leninist orientation

S = Stalinist orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

Ulbricht adopts the ahistorical approach to German civil-military relations in his acceptance of Stalinist doctrine. There is a rejection of the history of the Germany military and adoption of the Soviet experience as an appropriate source of expertise. There is also a rejection of the need for a military that is only responsible to the German state. Instead the *Nationale Volksarmee* is portrayed as subordinate and responsible to the Soviets. Corporateness is rejected and there is an insistence on unity between the working class and the soldier.

In a typical rejection of German military history and civil-military relations, Ulbricht makes the following statement:

"Just as the streets and fields had to be cleared of rubble and ruins, and the material foundations of nazism and militarism had to be uprooted, the elimination of the intellectual damage, the moral corruption and the mental filth had become necessary. School, university, press, literature and radio had filled the great masses of the German people with ideas of race hatred and chauvinist

arrogance and planed them morally and mentally in the service of military drill."<sup>99</sup>

He insists that in the place of German history, "...the DDR must master the weapons and combat techniques of, as well as the comradeship with, the Soviet army."<sup>100</sup> A further example is Ulbricht's statement at the founding of a military academy where he proclaims that its mission is to study, "...the historical experiences of the Soviet military."<sup>101</sup> There is no mention of the German military experience in this inaugural speech.

The responsibility of the East German military is typically not directed to the German state or the Germans themselves, but to the Soviets. This is demonstrated in the following passage:

"Through their (Soviet) readiness to assume command of a unified command under which the military strength of the people of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the DDR,

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<sup>99</sup>Walter Ulbricht, "The First Steps toward Intellectual Renewal of the German People," in On Questions of Socialist Construction, (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1968): 273.

<sup>100</sup>Walter Ulbricht, "Aus der Referat des Ersten Sekretars des ZK der SED und Ersten Stellvertreters des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, W. Ulbricht, auf dem V. Parteitag der SED 10 Juni 1958," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 234.

<sup>101</sup>Walter Ulbricht, "Aus der Vorlesung des Ersten Sekretars des ZK der SED und Ersten Stellvertreters des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR vor der Volkskammer der DDR, W. Ulbricht, zur Eroffnung der Militarakademie "Friedrich Engels in Dresden 5 Januar 1959," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 244.

Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania will serve, there will be a prevention of a surprise attack by the imperialistic adventurers."<sup>102</sup>

The corporateness of the military is denied. Instead there are assertions of military unity with the people as demonstrated in continuous citations of Lenin's, "Workers of the world unite," and the fact that the, "*Nationale Volksarmee* will be an army of the working class."<sup>103</sup> These statements include assertions that soldiers will be, "educated to love the working and peasant class."<sup>104</sup> There is no stated subordination of the soldier or the officer to the military command structure. The military is portrayed as being organically one with society. These are, therefore, statements of a belief in the need for deep permeability of the boundaries between the military and the society.

Will Stoph has a more mixed approach to civil-military relations. The defense minister sits astride the Reformist

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<sup>102</sup> Walter Ulbricht, "Aus der Referat des Ersten Sekretars des ZK der SED und Stellvertreters des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, W. Ulbricht, auf der 24. Tagung des ZK der SED, 1 Juni 1955," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 156.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 158.

<sup>104</sup> Walter Ulbricht, "Aus der Rede des Ersten Sekretars des ZK der SED und Ersten Stellvertreters des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR an der Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Prag, 27 Januar 1956," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 196.



Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist conceptions of civil-military relations. Seven documents were coded.

Table 3: Willi Stoph

	W	R	S	P
Expertise	0	4	3	0
Responsibility	0	2	4	0
Corporateness	0	1	2	0

W = *Wehrmacht* orientation

R = Reformist Marxist-Leninist orientation

S = Stalinist orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

The following extracts from his statements demonstrate his sometimes contradictory attitude to civil-military relations. The first citation shows a Soviet-dominated approach to learning new technology and leadership ability. "We learn from the experience rich history of our great example, the Soviet Army..."<sup>105</sup> The second shows his desire to have modern German expertise. "We will collect and develop modern technology with which to arm our democratic and patriotic soldiers."<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup>Willi Stoph, "Aus der Diskussionsrede des Mitglieds des Politburos des ZK der SED und Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung der DDR, Generaloberst W. Stoph, auf dem V. Parteitag der SED, 12. Juli 1958," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 236.

<sup>106</sup>Willi Stoph, "Aus der Diskussionsrede des Mitglieds des Politburos des ZK der SED und Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung der DDR, Generaloberst W. Stoph, auf der 3.

There is a similar mixture of sentiment regarding the responsibility of the East German military. On the one hand he demands that the *Nationale Volksarmee* be fully responsible to the Soviet Union. "...in our relations to the Soviet Union we are obligated to the Warsaw Pact...to stand at its side in defense of world peace."<sup>107</sup> On the other hand, he insists that the East German military serve the Germans in patriotic fashion. "You understand that it is your duty to defend your fatherland and to complete your service with honorable national responsibility."<sup>108</sup>

Stoph's citations of the corporateness of the military are largely Stalinist and they are not very frequent in this study's sample. He states, "In the DDR, all the people carry the power of the state on their shoulders."<sup>109</sup> He also

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Parteikonferenz der SED, 29. März 1956," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 201.

<sup>107</sup>Willi Stoph, "Aus der Rede des Mitglieds des Politburos des ZK der SED und Stellvertreters des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, W. Stoph, vor der Volkskammer der DDR 18 Januar 1956," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 193.

<sup>108</sup>Willi Stoph, "Aus der Rede des Mitglieds des Politburos des ZK der SED und Stellvertreters des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR, W. Stoph, vor der Volkskammer der DDR 18 Januar 1956," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 41-42.

<sup>109</sup>Deuerlein, Ernst. and Hansjürgen Schierbaum, eds., "Willi Stoph, '18 Januar 1956: Aus der Erklärung des Stellvertretenden Ministerpräsidenten Stoph,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Dokumente zur Deutschland Politik: III Reihe,

states that the military must be a disciplined and combat-ready instrument of the state."<sup>110</sup> Thus, on the one hand, he calls the military a part of society, on the other hand it is to serve as a disciplined instrument of the state. In the latter sense there is an indication of some separateness of the military from society. The *Nationale Volksarmee* cannot serve as a "disciplined instrument" without some degree of corporateness.

### The East Germans: 1966-1968

The results portrayed in Chart 2 clearly demonstrate a change. The deepest part of the change is the disappearance of the Stalinist approach to civil-military relations in comparison to the first period. There is a marked shift in elite statements to a greater reliance on internal German traditions as well as self-reliance. It should be noted that this chart shows only the final results of the coding. There were citations of Stalinist character in the statements by

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Band 2/1956, (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1961): 41.

<sup>110</sup>Willi Stoph, "Aus der Diskussionsrede des Mitglieds des Politburos des ZK der SED und Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung der DDR, Generaloberst W. Stoph, auf der 3. Parteikonferenz der SED, 29. März 1956," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 201.

Ulbricht, they were, however, greatly outnumbered by the Reformist types of citations.

Walter Ulbricht displays a marked change. He has moved to deriving military expertise from inside of East Germany as well as from its history. The responsibility of the East German military is now to the East Germans. Further, Ulbricht now calls for discipline and obedience in the *Nationale Volksarmee*. Seven documents were coded.

Table 4: Walter Ulbricht

	W	R	S	P
Expertise	0	7	0	0
Responsibility	0	4	0	0
Corporateness	2	0	0	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation

R = Reformist Marxist-Leninist orientation

S = Stalinist orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

The citations of the past history of the German military as a source of military expertise are frequent and are based on what are interpreted to be progressive German officers and events. This is opposed to drawing on the Soviet experience. "The main issue is that our great work will be continued to final victory by young militant generations to the benefit of mankind."<sup>111</sup> "The *Nationale Volksarmee* as

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<sup>111</sup>Walter Ulbricht, "The Struggle of the German Democratic Republic for European Security," Documents on the National Policy of the GDR, 5 (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1969): 26.

well as its academy are the carriers of the progressive and revolutionary military traditions of the German people."<sup>112</sup> In this statement he goes on to cite the socially progressive battles that the German military fought in its long history.

The responsibility of the East German military is no longer overly portrayed in terms of obedience to and obligation to the Soviets. Now there is a recognition that the East Germany military serves the German state. Now the military is to serve to "...build the German tradition, and bring to life to indivisible unity between patriotism and socialism."<sup>113</sup> The soldier is to protect his "homeland."<sup>114</sup>

There is a large shift in Ulbricht's thoughts on the corporateness. While the number of citations is unfortunately small, the statements he does make are clearly different from his previous statements. Instead of the unity of the working and peasant class, now there is a high demand on discipline. "Successes in combat eventually depend on the exact execution

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<sup>112</sup>Walter Ulbricht, "Aus der Rede des Ersten Sekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, W. Ulbricht, zum 10. Jahrestag der Militarakademie 'Friedrich Engels,' 9 Januar 1969," Harald Buchholz, trans., in Die Militar- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 351.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., 352.

<sup>114</sup>Walter Ulbricht, "Appeal for the 20th Anniversary of the Foundation of the GDR," Documents on the National and International Policy of the GDR, 2 (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1969): 14.

of military orders..."<sup>115</sup> In this same source Ulbricht calls for strict discipline.

Heinz Hoffmann's profile is similar to that of Ulbricht. He consistently calls for German expertise as opposed to drawing strictly on the Soviet experience. Further, the German military is to serve East Germany and the military is to have some separateness from society. There is no sense of a demand for high discipline and obedience as in Ulbricht's statements though. Eight documents were coded.

**Table 5: Heinz Hoffmann**

	W	R	S	P
Expertise	0	8	0	0
Responsibility	0	8	0	0
Corporateness	0	2	1	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation

R = Reformist Marxist-Leninist orientation

S = Stalinist orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

In terms of expertise Hoffmann states that the Soviets and the German can learn from each other. He asserts that cooperative maneuvers serve to train both sides on the

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<sup>115</sup>Walter Ulbricht, "Army Service is a Class Mission," in On Questions of Socialist Construction, (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1968): 516.

technical requirements of modern warfare.<sup>116</sup> It is clear from all of his statements that the Germans have an independent contribution to make to the overall expertise of the Warsaw Pact. There is a sense of greater self-confidence.

The responsibility of the *Nationale Volksarmee* is clearly to the state when Hoffmann says it is, "...the most important armed instrument of the German socialist state which provides for the defense of the lives and property of our citizens..."<sup>117</sup> There is longer the previously mandatory mention of it serving or being obligated to the Soviet Union.

His discussion of corporateness is mixed when he, on one hand, calls for the old expressions of the army and people being one<sup>118</sup> while he also calls for soldiers to be responsible to socialism and the state that leads it.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>116</sup>Heinz Hoffman, "Aus einem Interview des Mitglieds des ZK der SED und Ministers für Verteidigung der DDR, Armeegeneral H. Hoffmann, für die Zeitschrift, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik, November 1966," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 334.

<sup>117</sup>Heinz Hoffmann, "Aus einem Artikel des Mitglieds des ZK der SED und Ministers für Verteidigung der DDR, Armeegeneral H. Hoffmann, in der Zeitschrift 'Militarwesen', April 1968," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989): 347.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>Heinz Hoffmann, "Aus der Ansprache des Mitglieds des ZK der SED und Ministers für Verteidigung der DDR, Armeegeneral H. Hoffmann, auf dem Abschlussappell der Aktion 'Signal DDR 20', im 'Feldlager Junger Patrioten' in Bad Saarow, 26. Mai 1969," trans. H. Buchholz, in Die Militar- und Sicherheits-politik der SED: 1945-1988, (Militarverlag der Deutschen

This last sentiment is echoed in the above citation of the *Nationale Volksarmee* being as "instrument of the state."

The West Germans: 1955-1958

The West German elites express considerable concern with the proper tradition for their new army. There is wide debate on the proper role of the new military in society. This debate is reflected in the spread of orientations in Adenauer and Strauss's statements in the initial period. Adenauer, in specific, expresses great concern about ensuring that the soldiers of the defunct *Wehrmacht* get proper treatment. His explicit citations of the honorable contribution of the German soldiers in the war is surprising given the pervasive reeducation programs that were conducted in West Germany at the end of the war. 17 documents were coded.



Table 6: Konrad Adenauer

	W	R	A	P
Expertise	4	3	7	0
Responsibility	0	1	6	0
Corporateness	0	1	2	0

W = *Wehrmacht* orientation  
 R = Reformist Prussian orientation  
 A = Ahistorical orientation  
 P = Pacifist orientation

Adenauer discusses the positive image that he sees as mandatory for the ex-*Wehrmacht* soldier in terms of his son's experience. He states, "One son of mine almost ended up in the *Waffen SS*, not through his own free-will, but simply because the order arrived one day too late. This could happen to anyone."<sup>120</sup> Throughout his statements he consistently asserts the need for respect for the officers and soldiers of the *Wehrmacht*. With these statements as a vehicle he also asserts that *Wehrmacht* soldiers are a valid source of expertise for the new cadres for the *Bundeswehr*.

His strongest orientation on the expertise of the new West German military is, however, from the Europeans and the Americans, as well as the creation of a new expertise. His statements reflect the non-traditional approach that is described by the secondary sources as underlying the

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<sup>120</sup>Gunter Buchstab, ed., "Nr. 16: 20 September 1956," trans. H. Buchholz, in Adenauer: "Wir Haben Wirklich etwas Geschaffen." Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1953-1957, (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1990): 1089.

recreation of the *Bundeswehr*. A theme that runs through his statements regarding the creation of a valid expertise for the new German military is the difficulty of overcoming psychological inertia. He insists that it will take a long time to create a new military. This is a reference to the legacy of the *Wehrmacht* and its atrocities. In this context he discusses the new tradition that has to be created.

The clearest expressions of Adenauer's conception of civil-military relations is contained in his address to the first unit of the *Bundeswehr*. In this statement he discusses only the, "new technical demands of modern militaries," as a source of expertise.<sup>121</sup> History does not enter into this statement.

The responsibility of the new armed formations are portrayed as oriented to NATO as well as to the United States and not directly to the German state itself. The references to the responsibility of the soldier to the state is in terms of defending and supporting democracy. These citations are, however, outnumbered by supranational responsibilities. There are consistent calls for the *Bundeswehr* to serve in the interests of Europe as a whole. This responsibility of the

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<sup>121</sup>Konrad Adenauer, "20 Januar 1956: Ansprache vor der ersten Einheit der Bundeswehr in Andernach," trans. H. Buchholz, in Konrad Adenauer: Reden 1917-1967, Eine Auswahl, (Stuttgart: Hans-Peter Schwarz Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975): 316.

*Bundeswehr* is to the "commonwealth of free peoples," and to the, "allies."<sup>122</sup>

Adenauer makes few statements about the level of corporateness necessary for an effective armed force. He does make statements about the need for discipline and obedience, but these citations are outweighed by calls for an open and completely permeable boundary between the military and society. The theme is one of equal rights, just like any other citizen, for the soldier.<sup>123</sup> The soldier is not to be a "second class citizen,"<sup>124</sup> or one that has rights that are different from those of the citizen of the general population.

Franz-Josef Strauss's perceptions on the proper civil-military relations for the new West German military sit astride the Reformist and the Ahistorical orientations. 14 documents were coded.

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<sup>122</sup>Ibid., 314.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., 315.

<sup>124</sup>Gunter Buchstab, ed., "Nr. 9: 30 September 1955," trans. H. Buchholz, in Adenauer: "Wir Haben Wirklich etwas Geschaffen." Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1953-1957, (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1990): 616.

Table 7: Franz-Josef Strauss

	W	R	A	P
Expertise	0	3	8	0
Responsibility	0	6	6	0
Corporateness	0	5	4	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation  
 R = Reformist Prussian orientation  
 A = Ahistorical orientation  
 P = Pacifist orientation

His expressions of the proper source of expertise is balanced between statements of a new modern and highly technological force that is to be derived from the Europeans, and particularly the Americans, and statements that call for the Germans to develop their own expertise. He generally rejects the lessons learned from the past. He states, "We must go beyond the conceptions of German defense that were developed from, perhaps, 1870 to Hitler."<sup>125</sup>

Another clear statement of his approach to developing a new expertise for the *Bundeswehr* is that, "Every era has new expressions and the lives of people are in constant development. Also the forms of living with a military and the fulfillment of military requirements have to be constantly

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<sup>125</sup>Franz Josef Strauss, "Der Grosse Prugel," trans. H. Buchholz, in Der Spiegel. Nr. 1. (2 Januar 1957).

reworked."<sup>126</sup> His approach to this development is a concentration on the new technology needed for an effective military. A typical statement is the following description of military duty, "The art of fulfilling one's military duty... must be in conformity with the contemporary state of the art of technology and in accordance with today's evolution in tactics."<sup>127</sup>

The proper source of responsibility is divided between being to the Germans and being to Europe as a whole. Practically every statement of the responsibility of the German military is combined with the need for a high sense of responsibility for the Europeans as a whole. A typical combination of these sentiments is, "Such a *Bundeswehr* will, in obligation to the Western defense coalition, defend our freedom and democracy."<sup>128</sup> Nevertheless, the majority of his statements reflect an orientation toward the military's need to support democracy. A typical statement of this is when he states, "You must understand that living in a democratic

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<sup>126</sup>Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Franz-Josef Strauss, 'Tagesbefehl an die Soldaten der Bundeswehr vom 31 Oktober 1956,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Deutschland im Wiederaufbau: Tätigkeitsbericht für das Jahr 1956, (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1956): 305.

<sup>127</sup>Deutsches Bundestag, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Strauss, speaking before the Bundestag, 5. Wahlperiode, 169 Sitzung, trans. H. Buchholz, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, (8 November 1956), Band 32, 9290.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., 9291.

Germany and fulfilling military duty are not mutually exclusive."<sup>129</sup>

Corporateness is expressed by Strauss again as balanced between the need for discipline and obedience and the need for the military to have very permeable boundaries. He participates in a parliamentary debate in which he defends the need for the military to be somewhat separated from society due to the nature of the need for secrecy in military planning.<sup>130</sup> At the same time he insists that he does not want an officer corps that is as obedient as a "cadaver" and this corps must have a strong sense of responsibility to society. His expressed intention is to create a military that is an integral part of society.<sup>131</sup>

#### The West Germans: 1966-1969

The results of the second time period content analysis is very interesting in regards to the hypothesis that I have

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<sup>129</sup>Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Franz-Josef Strauss, 'Tagesbefehl an die Soldaten der Bundeswehr vom 31 Oktober 1956,'" Harald Buchholz, trans., in Deutschland im Wiederaufbau: Tätigkeitsbericht für das Jahr 1956, (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1956): 305.

<sup>130</sup>Deutsches Bundestag, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Strauss, speaking before the Bundestag, 5 Wahlperiode, 189 Sitzung, trans. H. Buchholz, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, (1 Februar 1957), Band 35, 10793.

<sup>131</sup>Ibid., 10795.

posited. In a very surprising fashion Kiesinger's statements contain strongly worded calls for peace when he talks about the proper role of the military in society. Further, whenever he talks about the military he talks about it in terms of its subordination and responsibility to NATO and to Europe as a whole. Kiesinger makes few comments about the corporateness of the military. However, when he does discuss it there is a strong emphasis on the need for the military to be completely open to the public. 21 documents were coded.

Table 8: Gerhard Kiesinger

	W	R	A	P
Expertise	0	2	3	13
Responsibility	0	3	16	1
Corporateness	0	0	3	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation  
 R = Reformist Prussian orientation  
 A = Ahistorical orientation  
 P = Pacifist orientation

Kiesinger makes few direct comments about the expertise of the *Bundeswehr*. When he discusses the German military there are overwhelming citations of the need for peace. He states that, "The most important thing that the Great Powers and Germany can do is maintain the peace."<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>132</sup>Gisela Oberlander, "Gerhard Kiesinger, '16 August 1967: Aus dem Interview des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger für die Fernsehsendung 'Meet the Press' der 'National Broadcasting Company,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Dokumente zur Deutschland Politik, V Reihe. Band 1. Zweiter Halbband, (Frankfurt am

He also states that, "Above all of our efforts... it would not be forgivable if we in our world, did not keep the peace in Europe. I remind you that the keeping of the peace is the central idea, the central thought and the central statement of our government,...because I know that it is the desire of our people."<sup>133</sup> To provide a real sense of his statements I would have to recite an entire one. His statements of only several hundred words sometimes have ten or more citations of the need for peace which are also mixed with fewer citations of the need for a modern and technologically advanced military. For this reason his statements are consistently coded as pacifist. In addition practically every statement recalls the West German government's rejection of the use of force in reconciling the issue of the two Germanies. The denial of the use of force, or *Gewaltversicht*, is almost as prevalent as his calls for peace. He is certainly not striving to motivate the *Bundeswehr* with his insistence that force cannot, ever, be used and that the *Bundeswehr*'s only mission is to preserve the peace.

The responsibility of the *Bundeswehr* is consistently portrayed as lying firmly with NATO. Practically every statement claims that, "the mission of the *Bundeswehr* can only

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Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1984): 1535.

<sup>133</sup>Gisela Oberlander. ed., "Gerhard Kiesinger, '4 November 1967: Aus der Rede des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger in Pirmasens,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Dokumente zur Deutschland Politik, V Reihe, Band 1, Zweiter Halbband, (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1984): 1961.



be accomplished if it is part of a strong NATO."<sup>134</sup> Also, "The responsibility of the *Bundeswehr* is to NATO in its defense of security and freedom of the non-communist peoples of Europe."<sup>135</sup> His comments uniformly call for the unification of Europe and the role that Germany must play in such a unification. Although it is not empirically demonstrable, one gets the sense that he is constantly aware of the historical threat that Germany has been to Europe, and that he is addressing Europe with the intent of down-playing any possibility of that threat reasserting itself.

Regarding comments on the corporateness of the military Kiesinger makes few comments. There is no typical statement. He does not contradict his strong calls for peace with calls for a cohesive and disciplined military force that could engage in combat. Whenever he does discuss the corporateness it is in terms of the military being an inseparable part of society.

Gerhard Schroder largely parallels the sentiments of the Chancellor. He does not, however, have the same number of

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<sup>134</sup>Gisela Oberlander, ed., "Gerhard Kiesinger, '25 August 1968: Interview des Bundeskanzlers Kiesinger für den Südwestfunk,'" trans. H. Buchholz, Dokumente zur Deutschland Politik, V Reihe, Band 2, Zweiter Halbband, (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1987): 1135.

<sup>135</sup>Gisela Oberlander, ed., "Gerhard Kiesinger, '6 Oktober 1968: Aus der Rede des Bundeskanzler Kiesinger auf dem Deutschtage 1968 der Jungen Union Deutschland in Ludwigshafen,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Dokumente zur Deutschland Politik, V Reihe, Band 2, Zweiter Halbband, (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1987): 1368.

statements calling for peace. Further, his statements on the source of expertise for the *Bundeswehr* are strongly oriented on the European militaries and the United States. He also makes more comments on the corporateness of the military. 17 documents were coded.

**Table 9: Gerhard Schroder**

	W	R	A	P
Expertise	0	1	8	2
Responsibility	0	1	10	0
Corporateness	0	2	9	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation  
 R = Reformist Prussian orientation  
 A = Ahistorical orientation  
 P = Pacifist orientation

Schroder clearly expresses a desire to derive the expertise of the West German military from the Europeans and the Americans, as well as from new technology. Schroder also makes many references to peace, as his Chancellor does, but they do not dominate the discourse in a similar fashion. Instead his comments in response to questions on the readiness of the *Bundeswehr*, particularly those before the *Bundestag*, are full of the technical details of maintaining a technically competent military. There are no truly typical statements. If there were it would involve, perhaps, the speed and agility of a tank, not the role of history in shaping a German soldier. This is because his entire speeches before the

Bundestag deal with the technical details of military readiness. There is no reference to past expertise of the German military. He concentrates on the need for modern weapons systems that must be in compliance with the requirements established by NATO.

Just as Kiesinger expresses his desire for the *Bundeswehr* to be a part of NATO, Schroder insists that the German military is to remain subordinate to the European military forces. He states, "The mission of the *Bundeswehr* derives from the NATO alliance... and out of the resulting responsibilities."<sup>136</sup> And, "The security (of Germany) is maintained through the NATO alliance and Germany's tight cooperation with NATO."<sup>137</sup> There are very few references to the responsibility of the *Bundeswehr* to the German state.

Schroder insists that the military is to have extremely open boundaries. While he does not state that strong cohesiveness corrupts the military he does insist that the proper role of the military in society is one that has a great amount of unity with the public. His policy statements

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<sup>136</sup>Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Kurt Schroter, 'Sicherheit fur Deutschland,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung: 1967, (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1967): 158.

<sup>137</sup>Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Kurt Schroder, 'Das Bundesministerium fuer Verteidigung,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung: 1968, (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1968): 301.

call for "Days of the open door."<sup>138</sup> The goal of these days is to maintain the contact between the people and the military.

### Conclusions

Before going on to a comparison of the evolution of the elite's perceptions of civil-military relations a word on the operationalization of the components of civil-military relations is in order. Central here is the fact that only a few of the elements included in the ideal-type characterizations were present in the elites' statements. The West Germans in particular made very few statements about the Prussians and their conception of civil-military relations.

Further, in the West German case, there were few comments on the corporateness of the military. Except for some citations on discipline, and the need for openness in the military, the need for corporateness does not appear in their statements.

Generally speaking the East Germans reflected the operationalization of expertise, responsibility and corporateness better than the West Germans. While the total number of documents were fewer in the East German case, they

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<sup>138</sup>Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Kurt Schroder, 'Sicherheit fur Deutschland,'" trans. H. Buchholz, in Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung: 1967, (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1967): 165.

almost always covered all of the elements of civil-military relations. I cannot effectively comment on the reasons for this in the context of this study. I hypothesize that this may be due to the nature of the available documents.

### CHAPTER III

#### COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS

##### Comparison of East and West Germany

The analysis of elite statements has been conducted in terms of the roles that the political leadership play, and not the specific individuals that hold the offices. Their statements are regarded as reflections of the political culture in the two countries. As the statements are attributed to the most important political roles in defining civil-military relations, the results of content analysis of statements by the leading politician and the defense minister can be combined. This combination provides an overall snap-shot of the orientations communicated by these roles. I, therefore derive a composite view of their orientation toward civil-military relations. This provides an expression of civil-military relations at the highest level of both governments. This is the image the members of the military, as well as the general society received.

In this section compilations of the content analysis are presented for both time periods. These results are compared and discussed. In the sections that follow the

implications of this comparison for the hypothesis and its theoretical underpinnings, speculations on the causal mechanisms, and suggestions for further research are discussed.

#### Comparison in the Initial Period

There are similarities in the profiles of constellations of beliefs on civil-military relations among East and West German elites at the point of recreation of armed forces. The center of mass in each case is on the Stalinist and ahistorical approaches. The implication is that the elites did not publicly portray their military history as a basis for military reconstruction. Instead they looked to other sources. They used Soviet and other ally's examples, as well as, modern technology and contemporary tactics.

Table 10: The East Germans: 1955-1958

	W	R	S	P
Expertise	0	5	9	0
Responsibility	0	3	10	0
Corporateness	0	1	9	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation

R = Reformist Marxist-Leninist orientation

S = Stalinist orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

Table 11: The West Germans: 1955-1958

	W	R	A	P
Expertise	4	6	15	0
Responsibility	0	7	12	0
Corporateness	0	6	6	0

W = Wehrmacht orientation

R = Reformist Prussian orientation

A = Ahistorical orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

There is clearly a greater spread in the constellation of beliefs in West Germany. This is likely to be the result of the greater openness of the political discourse in West Germany. It is also a possible reflection of Eckstein's ideas on the formlessness of political culture hypothesized to occur after societal upheaval. The spread of beliefs is not as great in East Germany. There the new communist government and its officials adopted Stalinist dogma as a basis for its new armed forces. This is a possible reflection of the legalism that Eckstein discusses.



Instead of recreating the old political culture, it is possible that a new and foreign political culture was grafted onto, and enforced in place of, historical examples of civil-military relations.

In general the postulates that Eckstein proposes appear to be confirmed in the first period. There is formlessness in the West German case, and there is legalism, and conformity with the Soviet example, in the East German case.

#### Comparison in the Second Period

A comparison of the compiled orientations of the East and West German elites in the second period reflect very different profiles after ten years of military development. If Eckstein's postulates are accurate constellations of beliefs should move closer together, as well as return to historical foundations of the political culture. If there was a return to historical foundations of civil-military relations, it occurred only in East Germany. This is a curious finding given the recognized nature of dogmatic communism in East Germany.

The East German compilation is firmly inside the Reformist Marxist-Leninist orientation. This is a return to a more traditional civil-military relationship. The West

German case becomes even more firmly grounded in the Ahistorical approach than in the initial period.

**Table 12: The East Germans: 1966-1968**

	W	R	S	P
Expertise	0	15	0	0
Responsibility	0	12	0	0
Corporateness	2	2	1	0

W = *Wehrmacht* orientation

R = Reformist Marxist-Leninist orientation

S = Stalinist orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

**Table 13: The West Germans: 1966-1968**

	W	R	A	P
Expertise	0	3	11	15
Responsibility	0	4	26	1
Corporateness	0	2	12	0

W = *Wehrmacht* orientation

R = Reformist Prussian orientation

A = Ahistorical orientation

P = Pacifist orientation

As stated in the last chapter, the calls to peace contained in discussions of civil-military relations in West Germany are surprising. It is not, however, completely unpredictable. The late 1960's are a time of great difficulties in the West German military and society. There were great controversies over the role of discipline. The soldiers gained a very negative image due to their long hair

and perceived laxity. The issue of conscientious objectors was high on the political agenda. Perhaps the real question is whether these problems were caused by the strong calls to peace by Kiesinger, or if he was responding to the objective lack of high motivation among the troops, as well as society, for developing an effective armed force. These concerns may also form the basis for directing the responsibility of the *Bundeswehr* toward NATO. As stated in the section discussing Kiesinger's statements, the West Germans continually appear to respond to the fears of a resurgent German militarism in their neighbors. This may be the cause of their lack of public recognition of the responsibility the *Bundeswehr* has to the German state.

In the West German case there is also a greater and continued spread in the constellation of beliefs. The central theme appears to be one of continued reliance on non-traditional or ahistorical approaches to conceptions of civil-military relations. The elites' conception of civil-military relations did not coalesce around any themes with the exception of a devotion to peace and subordination to NATO. These cannot be considered a return to prior German conceptions of civil-military relations. Instead it represents a continued rejection of historical conceptions.

The East Germans, however, move to a higher reliance on statements of civil-military relations that are in accordance with historical examples. There is a far greater

recognition of the contributions of internal German military development, as well as placing those contributions in terms of the historical contributions of the German officer corps to German military development. While the East Germans are still dogmatically communist, there is no longer the dependence on strict emulation of and responsibility to the Soviet example.

### The Results and the Hypothesis

The results of this study must be considered in terms of the limited nature of the conclusions that can be drawn. There are clear shifts in elite beliefs about the proper civil-military relations that should exist in the two Germanies. The hypothesis, however, called for a return to traditional types of conceptions of civil-military relations. This did not occur in West Germany. Adenauer started the reconstruction of the West German military with a very mixed set of beliefs about its relations to the West German society. Ten years later, Kiesinger, moved even further from traditional conceptions. All of these elites, in their roles of defining the nature of civil-military relations, did not express a return to historical conceptions called for by the hypothesis.

In East Germany there was a return to some aspects of traditional German beliefs about civil-military

relations. Ulbricht started the reconstruction of the military forces with a Stalinist and dogmatic approach. His minister of defense Willi Stoph was not as radically Stalinist in his constellation of beliefs. Ten years later, however, Ulbricht had reinvented the ideal of strict obedience and discipline, while at the same time moving in the general direction of relying on the history of the German military to provide a general orientation for the officers corps in their relations to society.

It is clear that the orientations of the two sets of elites moved in different directions. This does not serve the hypothesis well. The elites of the two Germanies did not converge as predicted by the hypothesis. There was an initial formlessness, as demonstrated by the spread in the constellations of beliefs at the point of recreation of armed forces in West Germany, and a legalist approach in East Germany . After that point in time, however, the two Germanies diverged.

It is in West Germany, in particular, that the hypothesis is not confirmed. Traditional conceptions of civil-military relations did not reassert themselves. In curious fashion it is in East Germany, one of the most dogmatic communist regimes, that the elites' perception of traditional civil-military relations seemed to make its strongest reappearance.

It must be asserted that this study does not conclusively disprove the assertions that Eckstein makes. There are many intervening variables that are not accounted for. Further, the statements of elites are not sufficient for accurate conclusions to be drawn about the political culture of the entire nation. These issues will be elaborated in greater detail in the next sections discussing potential causal mechanisms, as well as, further research that could shed greater light on the issue.

#### Speculation on the Causes of Change

There are several possible causal mechanisms that could serve to explain the results. The potential causal mechanisms include, individual psychological makeup of the elites, reeducation programs affecting socialization, the result of differing policies of the super-powers and the political relations the two Germanies had with their respective alliances. Causal mechanisms could also include the results of the differing political situations existing in the two Germanies, as well as differing social compositions of the officer corps.

In spite of regarding the individual's statements as expressions of the roles they play, it is clear that the background of these politicians can have a large impact on the manner in which they express their conception of civil-

military relations. This intervening variable could only be taken into account through a detailed analysis of the life experiences of each of the elites.

The differing social education programs that were instituted may have had a strong impact. There was intense reeducation, particularly in West Germany. In East Germany there were purges that had practically the same effect. These programs gave a wide audience intense exposure to the crimes that were committed by the Germans during the war. Were these programs more effective in West Germany? Did this result in a society that was less amenable to reconstitution of a disciplined, and effective force that could ground itself in the tradition of German military experience. How did Stalinist type purges in East Germany result in a return to a more historical approach to civil-military relations? These are questions that this intervening variable poses.

The effects of the different policies by the two superpowers could have played a central role in determining the policy statements of the two Germanies. Particularly in the case of East Germany political relations with the Soviet Union could have affected Ulbricht's statements. His later statements were analyzed at a point in time in which Ulbricht started to exert his independence from the Soviet Union. His greater assertiveness in the post-Stalin era

could have moved him to reinterpret the previously subordinate role of the East German military.

The internal political situation that existed in the two Germanies could certainly also be an important intervening variable. The East Germans have long been described as lacking in internal legitimacy. The return to calls for discipline in East Germany could be a reflection of this. This study could have measured the need for discipline in a manner that misses what is really going on. Just as central economic planning started to show that it might not be working as well as it should and there were calls for increased discipline in the work force, so the East German government could have realized that their soldiers were not motivated by the idea of an international workers' alliance. This could have motivated them to call for increased discipline in the ranks.

In West Germany, governmental attempts to stay in power may have motivated the political elites to speak to the pacifist currents in their society. The West German military in the late 1960's is well known for its laxity. Thus, there may not have been a rejection of military culture in the political elites rather than a conforming to the reality in society. This, however, also points to the lack of persistence that military culture seems to have had in West Germany.



A final potential cause of influence lies in the social composition of the officer corps of each of the militaries. While the East Germans claimed to have removed all the senior officers of the *Wehrmacht*, if a high percentage of veterans remained in the *Nationale Volksarmee*, they may have exerted their influence to change elite's expressions of civil-military relations. In similar fashion the West German case may have seen a reduction of the influence of the ex-*Wehrmacht* officer corps. This intervening variable would affect the military audience that the elites were speaking to.

#### Limitations of Studies of Political Culture

This study was designed to look at a very circumscribed definition of military culture as a part of political culture. If the softness of the concept of political culture is to become firmer, further research on specific and well defined aspects of political culture must be conducted. There is an intuitive validity in the concept of political culture, but exactly what it is and what impact it has is still open to contention.

One of the limitations of this study is that it investigated political or military culture in terms of a very limited selection of elites. The result is that the outcome is very much determined by the psychological makeup

and political goals of the particular elites studied. A more thorough study would look at a broader section of the political elites, as well as include other groups such as academic advisors that were involved in the decision-making process.

Further, this study does not take into consideration the political culture of the mass of people in each nation. It is a questionable proposition that, particularly in the East German case, the general population would reflect the elite's expressions of civil-military relations. Further, it does not reflect the conditions prevailing in the militaries and their relationship to society.

Finally, the time period considered here is very limited. It is possible that the reassertion of political culture that Eckstein postulates takes longer than ten years. A comparison of current views with those covered in this study may be interested.

The upshot of this is that I cannot make generalized statements about the overall character of political culture in the two Germanies. The conclusions drawn in this study must be limited to those about the particular elites and their roles that were studied. Perhaps the most valuable conclusion is that further study is required before more significant conclusions can be drawn. Possibilities for such research are great.

### Suggested Further Research

There are several possibilities for further research on military culture, as a subset of political culture, suggested by this study. These can be broken down into two types. There are possibilities for further research of the case of the two Germanies. There are also possibilities for research of this type outside of the German case.

Further research inside of the Germanies could involve a closer look at the change that occurred. For example one could look at the levels and types of disciplinary actions taken inside the military to determine the level of compliance with the new conceptions of civil-military relations. Further, one could interview surviving veterans from the era to determine what popular and elite perceptions of civil-military relations existed. In addition, one could look at the field manuals published by the respective militaries. They are likely to be more concise expressions of the militaries' perceptions of their role in society. These are all areas of research that are now becoming possible given contemporary political revolutions.

In addition to further research in the time period covered in this study, one could look at recent events in East and West Germany. What is the result of the reunification of the two Germanies? In what direction are

current elites' expressions of civil-military relations going? Perhaps the division of the two Germanies constrained a full return to historical expressions and now reunification provides an opportunity for history to reassert itself.

Similar research can be conducted outside of the Germanies. The most similar cases would be studies of militaries like those of North and South Viet Nam and Korea. Each of these cases also had a common military tradition that was disrupted through political revolutions and physical separation.

Another possibility lies in looking to the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe. It would be interesting to determine if there was a parallel resurgence of traditional concepts of civil-military relations in these communist countries. Given the resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet Union during World War Two a return to historical conceptions of civil-military relations may be a universal characteristic of communist regimes after they have undergone the initial convulsions of communist revolution. Perhaps the more dogmatically a regime attempts to change civil-military relations the more they are forced to rely on traditional and historical conceptions to motivate their soldiers.

In conclusion, there are many possibilities for further empirical research in the field of political culture and how it changes.

#### Closing Remarks

What is clear from this research is that there are more questions than answers. There was a shift in the make-up of the constellation of beliefs about civil-military relations in the East and West Germany elites. Exactly what this shift means is dependent upon uncovering the causes of the shift. -

The case of the two Germanies provides a crucial test of the persistence of political culture. This study provides a partial glimpse of its evolution in a limited period of time. Reunification of the Germanies, and the resulting opening of archives will provide the ability for greater depth in analysis.

## APPENDIX

This appendix provides the results of the content analysis. Each entry includes the results in terms of a short citation of each statement's orientation on each of elements of civil-military relations that were present in the document. It also serves as a listing of the primary documents consulted. It is organized as follows. The East German elites are covered first and in time order. The West Germans follow.

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Ahistorical orientation on expertise and corporateness.

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